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Abstract. 
 The study sought to establish the effectiveness of Conciliation and 
Arbitration as dispute resolution mechanism with the case of Ferro –Alloy 
Industry in Zimbabwe. A case study of 2 major players in the industry were 
examined in a descriptive research design. Backing the research is the concept 
of legal pluralism which then defined conciliation and arbitration as alternative 
dispute resolution systems. Management and Trade Union representatives, 
general employees and Labour Officers participated through interviews.  The 
research uncovered that the current legal framework was not providing a 
conducive and enabling regulatory environment to ensure an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism. The gaps in terms of time limits, the absence of explicit 
guidelines on conciliation, lack of finality to arbitral awards were identified as 
major drawbacks of the current legal structure. The State department, the 
Ministry of Labour, is the vehicle for an effective dispute resolution 
mechanism. The research identified that the department was inadequately 
resourced to enable speedy and prompt resolution of disputes. Due to the 
centrality and inevitability of disputes at workplace, the research 
recommended that government should amend the current legal framework to 
align it to International Labour Organisations provisions on conciliation and 
arbitration to ensure an effective resolution to disputes.  
Keywords: Ferro – Alloy Industry, Zimbabwe 
 
Introduction 
 Conflict is an inevitable characteristic and perspective in employment 
relations. This is motivated and precipitated by the dichotomy of interests and 
goals between parties in an employment relationship, that is, employers and 
employees. The dichotomy and clash of interest breed differences which could 
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be traced back to one classical founder of Social Science, Karl Marx in his 
Conflict Theory. According to Grint (2005) Karl Max propounded that 
individual and groups have different amounts of material and non-material 
resources that precipitate the clash of interest. The clash of interests 
precipitates organisational identity dissonance which subsequently pushes an 
aggrieved party to enlist the services of the third party to resolve such conflict 
or dispute. Conciliation and Arbitration have been employed since time 
immemorial as conflict resolution mechanisms. This study was carried out to 
establish the effectiveness of Conciliation and Arbitration as dispute 
resolution mechanism given the increase in the volume of cases which puts 
the mechanisms to test. 
 
Background of the study 
 The paper evaluated the effectiveness of conciliation and arbitration as 
conflict resolution mechanism in the Ferro- Alloy Industry in Zimbabwe. The 
two organisations understudy which are in the Ferro-Chrome will be named 
company A and Company B for ethical reasons. Both companies are major 
players in the Ferro Alloy Industry.  
 At their peak during the late 1990s, both companies used to employ in 
excess of 10 000 full time employees. They produced 250 000 metric tonnes 
of ferro alloy per annum which translated to about 10% of the ferro-alloy 
product on the international market. However at the turn of the new 
millennium the Ferro Alloy Industry was faced with serious challenges 
precipitated by a combination of factors. First it was the plummeting of the 
price on the international market. The depressed prices were caused by the 
oversupply situation in China. Before 2000, China was the major consumer of 
ferro alloy product on the International Market but that changed at the turn of 
the millennium when China became the major producer and resulted in the 
decline of prices. Another factor that contributed to the decline of prices was 
the World Economic recession of 2007 and the Euro-Zone crisis of 2011 and 
prices never firmed after the down turn. The increase in the cost of production, 
mainly electricity and other consumables, also pose viability challenges to the 
ferro alloy industry. 
 Faced with the above viability threatening challenges, employers in the 
said Industry devised and implemented some austerity measures which 
unfortunately resulted in a clash of interests and conflict between the employer 
and the employees. As early as 2000 both companies engaged in massive 
retrenchments resulting in nearly half of their 10 000 strong workforce losing 
their jobs. At dollarisation, both companies engaged in another retrenchment 
exercise to streamline labour in order to align it to the new production regime. 
Despite all these labour rationalization exercises which were carried out to 
reduce costs and ensure viability, the business still faces challenges. The 




following are some of the measures which were implemented by employers in 
the ferro alloy industry to ensure company survival and protection of jobs in 
the long run; 
 Introduction of two weeks rotational leave and consequently paying 
the affected employees at 50% of their basic salaries 
 Reduction of salaries with a certain percentage across all grades in 
order to align labour costs with production levels 
 Removal of allowances such as schools fees assistance, study 
allowance, transport allowance among others   
 Target based remuneration 
 Grade rationalisation 
 As a result the Ministry of Labour has witnessed a sharp increase in 
the number of cases from the above industry for Conciliation and Arbitration. 
It is against this back drop that the researchers were motivated to carry out this 
study in order to establish the effectiveness of Conciliation and Arbitration as 
dispute resolution mechanism given the increase in the volume of cases which 
puts the mechanisms to test. Conflict and disputes have been prevalent since 
time immemorial and Arbitration and Conciliation has been employed as 
dispute resolution mechanisms to bring disputing parties together and solve 
the dispute. The methods can date back to biblical times where people would 
approach Kings to seek recourse over disputes. One can quote 1 Kings 3 v 25 
in the Holy bible where King Solomon acted as a conciliator in trying to solve 
a dispute between two mothers over the ownership of a the child. A solution 
was reached and the child was given to its rightful mother. However there have 
been some changes in terms of the form and process in contemporary 
conciliation and arbitration process which this study seeks to establish whether 
the current dispute resolution mechanism is effective in solving disputes.   
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The Process of Conciliation and Arbitration in Zimbabwe 
 
Intra-organisation dispute resolution process 
 
 
Source: Duve (2011) 
 
 As depicted in Fig 1, it is important at this stage to expand the process 
of conciliation and arbitration. Once a labour dispute emerges, two parties to 
the employment relation seek recourse with the Ministry of Labour. The 
Ministry appoints a Labour Officer to sit over the case as a conciliator. 
However in an Industry with a registered Designated Agent (D.A), they 
register the dispute with the D.A who then sits as a Conciliator on the case. 
The National Legislative structure, the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) Section 93 
covers the conduct of conciliation in detail. The Conciliator is therefore like a 
mediator. Their role is not to pronounce judgement but to make parties 
appreciate the legal provisions of a dispute, if it is a dispute of right, and to 
explain consequences of not settling at that stage. The Conciliator as 
prescribed by the Labour Court has to facilitate the two parties to reach a 
mutually beneficial and agreeable solution. In the event of a deadlock, where 
two parties fail to reach a solution, the Conciliator will issue a certificate of no 
settlement to the disputants as prescribed by Section 93 (5) of the Labour Act. 
This is done upon consulting any labour officer senior to him and to whom he 
is responsible in the area in which he attempted to settle the dispute. The issue 
is then forwarded for arbitration. 




 The disputants are given an option to choose either the Ministry’s 
Labour Arbitrator or the Independent Arbitrator. The first option is usually 
longer and takes time to settle the dispute because of the volume of cases 
against a few responsible officials. However it is the cheaper option given that 
the parties are not required to pay anything. In order to control the process of 
Arbitration parties usually opt for the second option though the independent 
Arbitrator requires some payment. In Zimbabwe as in North America and 
China, the Arbitration system provides that the costs are borne equally by the 
disputants. In other regional jurisdictions like South Africa, Lesotho, 
Swaziland the costs of the arbitrator are borne by the state (Muriwo, 2008). 
Whereas elsewhere, systems provides for timeframes within which disputes 
are resolved by Arbitration, the Zimbabwean system is silent in this regard.  
 It is important to highlight that it is the parties themselves who define 
their points of difference and the actual dispute to be arbitrated. This provision 
under section 98 (4) democratised the conciliation system as opposed to the 
previous system where the Labour Relations Act empowered the Senior 
Labour Officer to state issues which in his opinion had to  be decided by 
arbitration resulting in the process being unjust on both parties (Duve 2011). 
This flexibility ensures that the arbitrator is appropriately guided and decides 
on the exact issues that have to be decided about. As a result there is no 
ambiguity on the nature of the dispute or the elements for which the disputants 
seek a resolution. The parties then make their presentations and heads of 
arguments in writing to the Arbitrator before the oral arbitral hearing. The 
appointment of Arbitrators consequently becomes the next step and it differs 
with the type of arbitration in course. In the case of compulsory arbitration, as 
previously illustrated, it is the Labour Officer who, after consulting a Labour 
Officer senior to him and to whom he is responsible in the area in which he 
attempted to settle the dispute refers the matter to an Arbitrator from a list 
provided by the Minister in consultation with the Senior President of the 
Labour Court and the fitting advisory council (Labour Act Chapter 28:01 of 
2005). The role of the Minister with regards to the provision and supply 
thereof of Arbitrators to cases has been subjected to criticism. There is no clear 
rationalisation in appointing Arbitrators to cases as the Arbitrators appear to 
be randomly selected. Mambara (2012) cited in Nemukuyu (2012) supported 
this notion with his opinion that the Arbitrator appointment system in 
arbitration is not systematic. He argued that Arbitrators are from different 
backgrounds and allocation of cases is done regardless of the area of expertise 
of that individual, thus arbitrators are given cases which they have no expertise 
in hence leading to poor decision making. 
 At Arbitration stage, the Arbitrator has the legal right to give an award 
that is binding and recognised legally despite there being no agreement 
between 2 parties.  Section 98 (14) of the Labour Act of 2005 provides that 
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once the Arbitral award is registered and shall have the effect, for purposes of 
enforcement, of a civil judgement of the appropriate court. The Labour Court, 
which is equivalent to a High Court, empowers arbitration through the 
emancipation of arbitral awards in this instance which gives more weight and 
relevance to the process. Howlett (1967) as cited in Duve (2011) supports this 
situation where he argues that for arbitration to command respect and facilitate 
the enforceability for its decision, it must take a sufficient role interpreting the 
general law of the state and be enforceable through it. Along the same line of 
argument, Duve (2011) then commented that arbitration has to work within 
the state’s legal framework and distinctively outside the centralist state court 
system. However there are some critics like Chulu (2011) who are totally 
against the court’s interference in arbitration. Through his analysis of the 
South African Arbitration system, Chulu (2011) recommended that there is 
need to have an independent arbitration board in Zimbabwe which enforces its 
own decisions. Mazanhi (2010) strengthens the argument stressing that once 
arbitration leaves room for courts then it seizes to be an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism and this subjects the process to ineffectiveness thereof. 
 As alluded to in the previous paragraphs, the Arbitrator has a legal 
standing to award a binding decision recognised before the courts of law. 
However this does not disqualify the right to appeal against the award by any 
of the disputing parties. Labour Act Chapter 98 (10) provides that any part can 
appeal to the Labour Court. Unlike the Arbitration stage where costs are borne 
by two partiers, the appellant is responsible for all legal fees. There is however 
doubts whether the Labour Court has review power over an Arbitral award. 
Madhuku (2011) noted that Labour Court Judges do not have much 
jurisdiction in issues that are employment related. It has also been established 
that one party may decide to appeal an Arbitral award as a ploy to delay justice. 
This is so because our Labour Act does not specify time frames and as a result 
cases may take over 5 years to be finalised. As observed by this writer, there 
are many cases across industries which are pending before the Labour Court. 
 The above procedure mirrors the voluntary arbitration process. The 
disputants agree on their own to use an outside party, a conciliator and 
arbitrator to help settle their differences. Voluntary arbitration implies that the 
two contending parties, unable to compromise their differences by themselves 
agree to submit the dispute to an impartial authority, whose decisions they are 
ready to accept (Marsey, 2007). Under voluntary arbitration as outlined 
before, the parties to the dispute can and do they refer voluntarily and dispute 
to arbitration before it is referred for adjudication. Doyle (2012) noted that this 
type of reference is known as 'voluntary reference'. In some instances in 
voluntary arbitration, an award may not be necessary and binding because 
there is no compulsion and this may be specifically needed for disputes arising 
under agreements. Voluntary arbitration is the most common form of 




arbitration employed in Zimbabwe in general and Ferro-Alloy Industry in 
particular. 
 There is another form of arbitration which is not common in 
Zimbabwe, the compulsory arbitration route. This is a legal and binding 
arbitration between disputants by a neutral third party that has been mandated 
by the government (Marsey, 2007). Compulsory arbitration is used when 
collective bargaining and other negotiation methods have failed to settle a 
disputes without either side resorting to extreme measures such as strikes or 
terminations. In some countries, arbitration may also be ordered by a court as 
a means to prevent a situation from going to trial (Bucher, 2007). It is however 
important to highlight that both voluntary and compulsory arbitration involves 
enlisting the services of the third party in order to resolve an impasse. 
 The effectiveness of Conciliation and Arbitration has been a subject of 
debate and dwelt with in literature ever since the turn of the new millennium. 
There has been no unified measurement criterion for the effectiveness of 
Conciliation and Arbitration as dispute resolution mechanism. This has been 
caused by the absence of a unified unit of measurement. Unlike in statistical 
measurement where scholars placed emphasis measurement based on statistics 
of case outcomes, contemporary thinkers like Trudeau (2002) came up with a 
non statistical framework. He designed a three factor model where he came up 
with 3 units of measurement used as yardsticks to determine the effectiveness 
of Conciliation and Arbitration as dispute resolution mechanism. However this 
paper will make use of Trudeau’s (2002) factors to assess the effectiveness of 
conciliation of arbitration only. These factors are: 
 
Accessibility 
 Trudeau’s (2002) three factor framework looks at how accessible the 
Arbitration and Conciliation is to both parties. He argued that we can only talk 
of the strength of these mechanisms if the process is accessible and parties 
have full knowledge of how it works as well as how readily the facilities can 
be accessed. Accessibility refers to the ease with which the disputants can 
resort to the process without the complication of technical consideration and 
complex legal framework (Trudeau, 2002).It is important to highlight that 
strength of conciliation and arbitration should then be measured looking at 
how the disputants can easily access the mechanism without any challenges 
which are prohibitive. conciliation and arbitration is easily accessible where 




The strength of arbitration and conciliation as dispute resolution 
mechanisms should not be concluded without looking at the speed of the 
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process in settling and resolving disputes. We should highlight at this stage 
that justice delayed is justice denied. The speed at which a system operates in 
dispensing justice is a paramount feature of justice delivery and a key feature 
of its strength and effectiveness (Duve, 2013). 
 
 
Expertise of Conciliators and Arbitrators 
 Expertise and competencies of those who preside over the process of 
conciliation and arbitration is also another important factor. The principal 
actors presiding over the process should be unquestionably competent, 
experienced, disinterested and neutral parties (Bishop and Reed, 1998). 
Decision of Arbitrators should not end at being merely reasonable; they should 
satisfy the requirement of fairness 
 
Finality of awards 
 A critical area one needs to consider when assessing the effectiveness 
of conciliation and arbitration as dispute resolution mechanisms is the issue 
surrounding the finality of awards handed out to settle the dispute. Unlike 
voluntary Arbitration which prescribes final awards which are impossible to 
set aside, Compulsory Arbitration awards are susceptible to appeals 
(Madhuku, 2010).  
 
Enforcement of awards 
 Closely related to the issue of finality of arbitral awards is the issue of 
enforcement of arbitral awards is also a critical aspect in assessing the 
effectiveness. In order to enhance counter the current challenges of arbitration 
as a dispute resolution mechanism, the awards should not only be final, but 
they should also be enforceable. 
 
Methodology 
 The research was purely qualitative and used 2 organizations in the 
Ferro- Chrome industry as case studies. The researcher in the first instance 
used purposive sampling which is also known as information-oriented 
sampling as opposed to probability sampling. Information-oriented sampling 
was deemed the best for the study because the researcher needed to target a 
certain segment of the population, for example Trade Union Representatives. 
Unlike Workers’ Committee Representatives, Trade Unions Representatives 
have the loci standi to represent workers during conciliation and arbitration 
process. As a result Workers tend to channel their grievances for conciliation 
and arbitration through Trade Union Representatives. Also the research also 
targeted Labour Officers who have specifically dwelt with Ferro- Alloy 
Industry disputes. Such information was drawn from the D.A for the Industry. 




The sample was drawn from 2 major players in the Ferro-Alloy Industry. 5 
Management, 5 Trade Union representatives and 5 general employees who are 
not Trade Union Representatives were drawn from the frame as sample from 
Company A and B . 2 Labour Officers were also part of the respondents. The 
region employs 9 Labour Officers in total. The Ferro – Alloy Designated 
Agent (D.A) was also part of the participants. The assumption behind the 
aforementioned participants is that it truly represents all parties involved in 
conciliation and arbitration in the Ferro-Alloy Industry. Key 
informantinterviews were used in soliciting data as well as the use of 
secondary data.  
 
Findings and discussion 
 From both companies it was pointed out that the process of conciliation 
and arbitration was very much affordable. This was because of the absence of 
conciliatory fees at the preliminary stage of the dispute resolution, which is 
the conciliation stage. However as pointed out by the Labour Officers, 90% of 
cases registered for conciliation usually find their way to arbitration where 
costs are involved in terms of arbitral costs and legal fees. As a result the 
absence of conciliatory fees does not make the process of conciliation 
affordable because the majority of cases are not settled at that stage. To this 
end the issue of affordability does not hold water given that most cases end up 
at a stage where costs are involved.  
 The issue of expediency and promptness of the processes was also 
highlighted as one of the strength of conciliation and arbitration. The 
conciliation outcome is usually settled in one sitting as a result both parties 
acknowledged that the process would expedite the resolution of disputes. 
However as noted above, conciliation is one process which has been viewed 
as a step towards arbitration. There are no binding resolutions from 
conciliation hence most cases are forwarded for arbitration where there is a 
legally binding resolution. Trade Union Representatives from both 
organisations highlighted that cases takes more than 36 months to settle if you 
take the involuntary arbitration route and a minimum of 12 months for a 
voluntary route. As compared to the court litigation route, yes the process is 
quicker and swift but in the interest of speedy resolution of disputes, 12 
months is a long time. As a result the processes are not effective.Despite the 
fact that compared to the court litigation system, conciliation and arbitration 
as a mechanism for dispute resolution is relatively faster, it should however be 
noted that the major drawback of our Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) is that it is 
silent interms of time lines within which the process of conciliation and 
arbitration could be concluded. The Zimbabwean Law does not impose a 
maximum time limit for a Conciliator or Arbitrator to make an award. This 
gap in law accounts for some of the delays in resolving labour disputes 
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(Gwisai, 2008). This could be attributed to the absence of set time lines in our 
legal framework in order to force arbitrators to resolve disputes with speed.  In 
other countries, like South Africa, their legal structure provides that the award 
should be awarded within 21-30 days from the day of the hearing (South 
African Labour Relation Act of 1995). In Lesotho, an Arbitrator is required to 
issue an award with brief reasons, within 30 days of the conclusion of the 
arbitration proceedings and that period can only be extended by the Director 
of the Directorate on good cause shown (Lesotho Labour Relations Act of 
1990). In Botswana, Section 9 (9) of the Trades Disputes Act of 2003 provides 
that upon conclusion of an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator shall make an 
award and shall, within 30 days of the hearing, give reasons for the award. 
Gwisai (2008) noted that cases can take more than 12 months before an 
Arbitrator can give an award thereby delaying justice. Mariwo (2008) 
bemoaned the delays encountered in resolving disputes through arbitration in 
the private security sector. This is one example of several cases pending before 
the Labour Arbitrators. Government Arbitrators usually takes longer than 
Independent Arbitrators because of the volume of cases coming against the 
number of Government Labour Officers. 
 It was also recorded that the alternate dispute resolution mechanism 
was less prescribed and less directed hence it have an edge over the complex 
and winding court litigation route. The above factors enhance accessibility of 
conciliation and arbitration and the flexibility may contribute to the 
effectiveness of conciliation and arbitration however it was noted that one 
party can manipulate and abuse the less prescriptive nature of the alternate 
dispute resolution mechanism to dodge and fail to implement mutually agreed 
resolutions especially from conciliation hearings. As a result it becomes a 
challenge to the dispute resolution mechanism. Also the discreet nature of 
conciliation and arbitration can play to the advantage of one part despite at 
face value it may appear as strength of the dispute resolution mechanism.  
 Management Representatives  from both companies bemoaned the 
incompetence highlighted by those who preside over disputes as a major 
challenge associated with the conciliation and arbitration. As a result this has 
seen cases taking too long to settle and parties contesting awards because they 
lack confidence in the presiding officers. The issue of costs was also recorded 
as a major challenge associated with conciliation and arbitration thereby 
impacting negatively on effectiveness of conciliation and arbitration. 
Madhuku (2010) conducted a study on behalf of the International 
LabourOrganisation where he highlighted that Labour legislation, regulating 
conciliation and arbitration in Zimbabwe prescribed no minimum 
qualifications for principal actors. Some Scholars have attributed the failure 
of the dispute resolution mechanism to the incompetence of those who preside 
over the cases. Mazanhi (2010) even noted that some designated agents drawn 




from some employment councils do not have proper qualifications and 
expertise to effectively and efficiently resolve cases brought before them. 
Statutory Instrument (SI) 173 of 2012 was promulgated in order to address 
this anomaly. It stipulated that an Arbitrator or a Designated Agent should 
have a minimum of a University Degree with at least 2 years experience in 
Human Resources or Industrial Relations field, a diploma in People 
Management. This provision was welcomed by all stakeholders as they saw 
that it would go a long way in enhancing the effectiveness of Conciliation and 
Arbitration as dispute 
 Unlike conciliation outcomes, arbitral awards are legally binding and 
enforceable. However they are not final. There is a provision to contest the 
award to the Labour Court. The alternate dispute resolution mechanism has 
the provision for the court system, the same system it was designed to counter. 
80% of arbitral awards are contested and as a result the disputes take to resolve 
and settle. The court litigation route takes more than 5 years in some instances. 
Given the centrality of disputes and their negative impacts on productive, the 
alternate dispute resolution mechanism is failing to resolve and settle disputes 
expeditiously and effectively. 
 The role of the State is basically to provide the legal framework within 
which the alternate dispute resolution mechanism operates. However there 
exist some gaps within the legal framework which impact negatively on the 
effectiveness of conciliation and arbitration.  The absence of guideline of 
conciliation and arbitration, the absence of time limits of arbitration cases, the 
limited powers of conciliators were noted as some of the challenges with the 
current legal structure on dispute resolution. It was also highlighted that the 
State is not adequately resourced to ensure a speedy and effective resolution 
of disputes.  To this end the process of conciliation and arbitration is marred 
with a lot of challenges which make it difficult for the process to achieve its 
mandate of speedy resolution and finalisation of disputes.   
 In line with Musa and Matsikidze (2009) findings, this research also 
established that there are no clear provisions which guide the process of 
conciliation alone. Management representatives pointed out that the legal 
framework is not explicit in terms of procedures to be followed on 
conciliation. This has created a gap interms of administration of the process. 
The Trade Union representatives also highlighted that the State needs to come 
up with the sound legal instrument which guides on the appointment of 
arbitrators to preside over arbitration cases. The current practice is not 
supported by any legal structures. Even the Labour Officers noted that they 
usually encounter challenges with Legal Practitioners during conciliation or 
arbitration process because of the absence of clearly explicit provision. 
 It is important to highlight that Trade Unions, Management and Labour 
Officers echoed the same sentiments on the idea that the current framework 
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on conciliation should revert and mirror the provisions of the Labour Relations 
Act of 1985.  The 1985 legal instrument gave the conciliators powers to give 
binding awards. Management representatives highlighted that the current legal 
structures have relegated them to mere facilitators with no legal standing to 
give a binding award thereby making the process a non-event. Given that 90% 
of the cases go beyond conciliation, it points to the fact that the process is not 
achieving what it was set to achieve. The conciliation process is seen as a step 
towards arbitration not a dispute resolution mechanism on its own.  
 On the issue of the State’s capacity, the Labour Officers conceded that 
as a Ministry they are constrained in terms of resources. They pointed out that 
it is the prerogative of the Ministry to notify respondent in writing, but because 
of lack of resources they only notify through telephone. Some respondents 
have capitalised on the resource constraints and they profess ignorance of the 
case before the Labour Officer. The Labour Officers highlighted that the 
appellant usually is burdened with the duty to service notification papers to 
the respondent and the respondent should sign to confirm receipt. Trade Union 
Representatives confirmed this position where they highlighted that 
sometimes they have to use their own resources in order to make sure they 
communicate with the other party. Both Management and Trade Union 
Representatitives echoed the same sentiments on the idea that the Labour 
Officers were overwhelmed by the increase in the volume of labour cases 
before them They reiterated that Government should employ other Officers in 
order to alleviate the problems of back logs and ensure speedy resolution of 
disputes. Trade Union Representatives added that individuals were failing to 
meet Arbitral costs charged by independent Arbitrators hence they resort to 
Government Labour Officers and as a result cases take more than 24 months 
to settle.  
 The role of the state has been identified as mainly that of creating a 
regulatory environment within which conciliation and arbitration operates. 
The environment either inhibits or enhances a process. However the findings 
pointed to the gap interms of the legal framework. These gaps impact 
negatively on the effectiveness of conciliation and arbitration. The gaps 
include lack of clear cut guidelines on conciliation, the act is silent on time 
lines among other irregularities. As a result the process of arbitration is left at 
the mercy of Labour Officers. The State controls the institution that deals with 
conciliation and arbitration. The Ministry of Labour is a State department and 
Ministry responsible for conciliation and arbitration as a result the State has a 
major bearing on the effectiveness of the system. The Labour Officers are 
State employed personnel and the instruments and other apparatus used for 
conciliation and conciliation are State controlled as a result the input of the 
State cannot be downplayed. However the research uncovered that the 
Government Labour Officers were overwhelmed by the number of cases 




coming for conciliation and arbitration resulting in a backlog and cases taking 
long to be heard and disputes settled. It is of paramount important to highlight 
that conciliation and arbitration as alternate dispute resolution mechanisms 
were adopted in order to counter the longer and winding court litigation 
system. However with few Labour Officers against a growing volume of 
Labour cases in the Ferro –Alloy Industry and the nation at large means that 
cases will take longer to settle than intended. To this end the conciliation and 
arbitration system is failing to ensure the effectiveness to dispute resolution 
which it was created to grant.  
  
Conclusion 
 Conciliation and arbitration were adopted as alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism in place of the technically complex, rigid, winding and 
longer court litigation system. This was precipitated by the realisation that 
dispute or conflict at industrial or organisational level can negatively impact 
on productivity. To this end conciliation and arbitration were adopted in 
inorder to ensure prompt settlement, conclusion and finalisation of disputes to 
enable a productivity environment at the work place. However it is note worth 
to highlight that the system has not achieved the effectiveness and efficiency 
it was designed and adopted to achieve. This research has uncovered that 
conciliation and arbitration are dogged with numerous challenges and 
inefficiencies that have impacted negatively on the effectiveness of the 
alternative dispute resolution procedure.The regulatory environment was 
reported to be the greatest undoing and was not enabling an adequate playing 
field. Gaps interms of guidelines, time lines to mention on but a few was 
highlighted as the major challenges faced by conciliation and arbitration and 
impacting negatively on the dispute resolution mechanism. Disputes find their 
way back in to the formal court litigation system, which points to the fact that 
conciliation and arbitration are nt effective enough to settle disputes at an early 
stage. The State as the main agent for conciliation and arbitration was reported 
to be in adequately resourced to facilitate the prompt settlement and 
conclusion to disputes at work place. 
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